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GLENN ON FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND PREFERENCES*

Fred T. Hansont

PConveyances and Preferences

ROFESSOR GLENN'S new two volume work on Fraudulent
is much more than a revised edition
,of his previous book. The treatment of preferences is new and the
material in the old book is revised and expanded. This expansion is
particularly evident in his dealing with commercial financing devicesconsignments, trust receipts, after-acquired property clauses, and freehanded mortgages of goods and accounts-which he now views also
from the standpoint of preference.
The avulsions and accretions in the stream of decisions during a
decade such as that just past might of itself call for a new edition. But
there are other reasons. The new rules made an important change in
federal procedure. New statutes have been passed. Most important of
these is of course the Chandler Act, which has a broad effect upon both
branches of the subject. A treatment of preferences before its enactment would now be largely obsolete.
The author himself gives a succinct outline of the work as comprising the single creditor's means of realizing his claim, the methods
employed in liquidation for the benefit of all, the avoidance of fraµdulent conveyance as increasing available assets, the property subject to
fraudulent conveyance, the debtor's exemptions, an analysis of fraudulent conveyance including reputed ownership, a discussion of preference, and an examination of commercial, financial and corporate devices
as involving the foregoing principles (§ 6).
In volume one Professor Glenn has to some extent used the section
numbers of the previous edition. Additional material is inserted in the
form of lettered subsections. Where former sections have been reshuffied, the old numbers are inserted parenthetically. Even this could
not be done consistently because part of the text is completely rearranged and the collective rights of creditors in liquidations are dismissed briefly, the author having treated these problems fully in
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another book published in the interim.1 The system of cross-reference
is not attempted in volume two, since the first eight chapters are devoted to the new material on preference and the succeeding chapters
on commercial devices have grown from fifty-eight to one hundred
ninety-one pages. The work itself has grown from five hundred eightyfive pages of text in the first edition, to one thousand sixty-eight pages
in the current one.
The book is not a complete digest of decisions on the subject, much
less of statutes that lie at its foundation. Text writing is rendered difficult enough by overrulings without also subjecting it to the hazards
of amendment and repeal. However, the author here, as in his original
work, does consistently present selected statutory material to give concreteness to his discussion so that it will furnish the reader a more
usable key to the interpretation of the statutes of his own state. The
principal statutes employed for the purpose are the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, now the law of seventeen states, and the Bankruptcy Act. Since in an exposition of principle, opinions, criticisms and
recommendations are points of interest, our attention will be given
chiefly to some of these.
In discussing federal rule I 8b, permitting a combination suit to
establish a claim and to set aside a fraudulent transfer, a point is made
concerning tort claims. As attachment statutes have been given no
implied applicability to tort actions, so statutes authorizing combination suits have received a like construction. The Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, by a definition covering "contingent claims," extends
its operation to tort claims not in judgment in the opinion of Professor
Glenn, and this desirable advance rule r8b fails to accomplish (§ 8r).
Concerning another consequence of the construction given to less specific statutes whereby the tort claimant is excluded from the combined
remedy in statutory proceedings against the property of a nonresident,
it is said: "Now, it is no more shocking to jerk back a joyrider in order
to set aside a tricky transfer of assets which frustrates the victim's suit
for damages, than it is to bring him back, by statutory service, to answer
for the tort itself." ( § 92a.) This certainly suggests a sound addition
to modern motorists' liability laws.
The fault in logic of the majority doctrine that consent receivers in
equity can attack fraudulent transfers is shown to be that property so
transferred is not part of the estate given them to administer since they
"stand in the debtor's shoes" ( § I 03). The same reasoning is applied
1
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to the minority of cases allowing an executor or administrator to do
the same without the aid of an express statute ( § l 04). The logic of
this is clear. Whether a decedents' estate statute may be otherwise sufficient to constitute the "personal representative" a statutory liquidator
where the estate proves insolvent, with consequent implied authority
to bring such suits, might be an interesting query. Certainly we join
in the conclusion that the laws of every state should expressly relieve
all assignees, receivers, and executors of the debtor's miry footwear.
The growth of the category of assets reclaimable is traced to the
stage where virtually everything that is assignable is covered. The
author advocates that provision of the Uniform Property Act, then in
proposed final draft, which clearly states that creditors are not barred
from access to interests in property merely because of their future or
contingent character(§ 149). This act, a joint product of the American
Law Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform Laws, has since been
finally adopted. The Chandler Act provision dealing with expectancies
simply brings into the estate all those interests that become assignable
within six months after the petition. Details are thus left to the states.
In a conflict of opinion as to whether, where the debtor is disinherited by a pretended will, the creditor has a remedy in equity, the
very practical view is taken that the interest of the debtor, the fraudulent document aside, is property. The heir is not forced to contest, but
the creditor may be subrogated to his right to do so (§ 141). Another
pragmatic view is taken on the availability of funds in court. The
modern rule allowing attachment of dividends declared and payable
from a fund in court, the author says, ought to be extended to effect
also a charge on future dividends by analogy to assignment. The creditor would not have to adopt a watchful waiting policy, yet no undue
interference with another court would be involved (§ 162):
Professor Glenn traces exemptions from the original items of
apparel and tools to the ultra modern debtor relief legislation-"the
Abbey of Theleme fast being constructed for the American debtor."
There are two passages in this chapter in sections 168 and 169a which
we should have liked to quote at length because they state in a delightful style the sturdy politico-economic views of the author. He gains a
little satisfaction from the provision of the Chandler Act that the bankrupt cannot claim as exempt any property recovered after fraudulent
conveyance or concealment.
In that part of his analysis of fraudulent conveyance which has to
do with methods of transfer, Professor Glenn takes issue with a circuit
court decision to the effect that a debtor's waiver of personal defenses,
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such as the statute of frauds or of limitations, cannot be a fraudulent
conveyance because of the moral right or obligation of the debtor to
pay. The author's thesis is that the debtor can by these lawful means
help creditors having enforceable claims and should not be allowed
to destroy defenses that the liquidator would be required by law to
assert when seated (§ 24rd). We are inclined to think that there is a
legitimate difference between the obligations of the debtor himself and
those of the liquidator.
Where the equities of a fraudulent grantee are concerned, Professor
Glenn favors the authorities that allow even the actually fraudulent
grantee an offset for expenditures that have had the effect of preserving the property for the creditors. Besides that practical point he cites a
judicial statement that it is not for equity courts to inflict punishment
(§ 255). True the grantee did the creditor a good turn, but probably
not in a repentant mood. So we may indulge in a little speculation about
the author's attitude toward the familiar civil consequences of illegality.
He states these without comment as they apply to an actually fraudulent conveyance while it remains executory ( §§ I I 6, I I 7). But there
the mesalliance of penology and civil adjustment is not apparent.
Neither wrongdoer is confirmed in possession, for the creditors will get
the property. In another place he remarks that "in pari delicto ... is
one of those old fashioned ways of saying nothing." ( § I I 9.) At least
such a phrase affords some elbow room in dealing with the illegality
formula.
In this edition the author gives up with regret his campaign for the
principle that proceeds of property insurance should always stand in
the place of the property. The result would be that the proceeds of
insurance effected by the grantee would go to the creditor subject to
an offset for premiums paid. But the rule that the insurance contract is
personal and the grantee can therefore keep the proceeds is too well
established (§ 257).
The minority rule that gifts are fraudulent if the donor has any
debts at the time is properly criticized. Statutes have corrected this in
some instances, and the rule is on the wane (§§ 268-27oa). Related
to this are Professor Glenn's adverse comments upon an opinion delivered by Justice Cardozo in 1935, holding that property received by
a promoter could be recovered for creditors although the corporation
remained solvent for two years after the transfer. This was not justified by the minority rule in question because the Supreme Court had
emphatically repudiated it (§ 606).
The new treatment of preferences begins with a brief survey of
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statutes avoiding preferences in liquidation of banks, national and state,
and assignments for the benefit of creditors, and notes the almost universal omission of this subject from legislation relating to settlement of
decedents' estates. Since insolvency is not the primary consideration in
such legislation, it is not surprising that the provisions for it are sketchy.
The preferee must have knowledge or notice of insolvency under
the Bankruptcy Act and some state liquidation statutes. It is ably argued
that great latitude should be allowed by implication in applying such
provisions in bank liquidation laws to withdrawals by depositors. Banks
are "utilities which the public must perforce use." Under strict administrative control, their prompt closure is "better, for the avoiding of
preferences, than the laissez faire method of letting preferences take
place and then uprooting them later." (§ 390.)
The greater part of the study of the preference relates to the
Bankruptcy Act, for only there has it attained real consistency. Professor Glenn expresses the hope that two doctrines-that extension of
time on a balance allowed to remain unpaid may be a new value to
support a preferential part payment, and that suspicion of insolvency
may be less than reasonable cause to believe that it exists-are on the
way out (§ 4ro).
The author points out serious criticisms of the Chandler Act. The
:first is that it reduces a bona fide purchaser from a preferee to the status
of a lienor for the amount paid if it appears that this was less than a
"fair equivalent value." While the draftsmen borrowed much from
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act with excellent effect, this
provision, appropriate as to fraudulent conveyance, makes an unwarranted change in the protection afforded the bona fide purchaser from
a preferee (§ 412). In Professor Glenn's picturesque phrase, the preference is a sporting proposition. The distinction between this and downright wickedness is well known. This criticism of the Chandler Act
applies to a like provision concerning bona fide purchasers, except at
judicial sale, under legal liens that are avoided ( § 440).
Another criticism of the Chandler Act also relates to the nullification of legal liens as preferential. The act codifies a decision holding
that a judicial lien obtained within the four months is dissolved also
as t-0 exempt property. Certainly this is a useless interference with rights
that do not affect the estate in bankruptcy. The only comtort to be
found in it is certainty of rule, as Professor Glenn remarks ( § 43 6).
A discussion of "The Government as a Preferee" (§ 428) is
prompted by a decision that the government could not be held as a
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preferee because of governmental immunity from suit and the priority
enjoyed by its claims. In section 8 such immunity was characterized as
immoral. While this can hardly be said of priorities for revenues to be
collected in the first instance, we agree that other priorities are in the
same class with immunities. It seems to us that losses incident to misfortune, bound to occur in governmental as in private activities, ought
to be borne by the constituency that the activities benefit ( or are intended to benefit) rather than by an individual victim or by the several
individuals who may happen to be co-creditors of the government's
debtor. This becomes increasingly apparent as government comes into
competition with private enterprise. After noting the reasons-immunity and priority-given for the decision under discussion, Professor
Glenn says:
"These reasons in law are sufficient; moralizing would be gratuitous.
"The writer is happy to reflect, however, that the Government's pocket corporations will not enjoy the same immunity.
As they are fully amenable to suit, and do not have priority in
the liquidation of debtors' estates,-that is, as yet,-these corporations should be made to respond if they happen to receive
fraudulent conveyances or preferences. It is to the credit of their
management, however, that so far the question has not arisen. It
would be even better if the question could not arise,-that is, if
it were possible to return to a state where government is not a
prominent feature of daily life. Here the writer has moralized
again, and he asks pardon accordingly."
Professor Glenn disapproves two decisions holding that in determining whether a surety was insolvent, his liability as surety should be
taken into account even though the principal is solvent. It seems to us
that the reason given in the cases in question-that payment to the
surety would create a right of reimbursement equal to the payment
-is compelling where the bankruptcy test of insolvency is applicable, as it is in matters of preference (§ 457). It might well be
otherwise if the trustee were suing to set aside a fraudulent conveyance under the Uniform Law or other statutes having the commercial
test of insolvency (§ 272 ).
The treatment of equitable pledge in its relation to preference includes an interesting discussion of the Chandler Act provision which
dates a preferential transfer from the time when it becomes so far perfected as to be good against a bona fide purchaser or creditor. The
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purpose of this is to eliminate the doctrine of relation back to the date
of the original agreement in cases of possession taken by an equitable
pledgee or of belated recording of instruments requiring record. Professor Glenn points out that the rights of a bona fide purchaser are
adopted as a test only and this test is furnished by state law, although
there seems to be concern in some quarters that it may give the trustee
the status of a bona fide purchaser ( § 48 8).
In this edition the commercial devices were for obvious reasons
reserved for treatment after the preference. The thesis that recording
acts are the breath of life to the chattel mortgage institution is convincingly presented. On the other hand statutory changes in the commonlaw conditional sale, introducing registry, deficiency judgment, and
freedom of resale, have so far assimilated it to the chattel mortgage that
Professor Glenn recommends to legislatures a reconsideration of the
question whether the conditional sale should be scuttled.
Consignment devices and trust receipts, while not statutory, have
such a relation to the doctrine of reputed ownership as to call forth
notoriety statutes such as the Traders' Acts and the filing provisions of
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. Professor Glenn suggests that the
similarity between these financing arrangements is such that trust
receipt statutes might well adopt from the Traders' Acts the requirement of placarding the dealer's place of business as the most
appropriate way of giving notoriety (§ 563). He also thinks the common-law trust receipt is in danger of falling under condemnation as a
freehanded mortgage where the financing banker does not undertake
to follow up collections (§ 558).
The chapter on after-acquired property clauses and freehanded
mortgages of goods and accounts completes an interesting exposition
of the e:fforts of modern merchandising to expand the use of commercial
capital as security.
We shall not pause with the professor to contemplate the "familiar
figures that move about in the pleasant pastures of corporate finance"
except to mark the thoroughness with which he explores all the ramifications of his subject.
The book presents more of logical unity than is suggested by the
title. It canvasses all the situations where the creditor may encompass
something the debtor has made unavailable to himself or merely appears to own. The reader is convinced of the wisdom of Professor
Glenn's decision to include preferences in the new edition, because the
combination is based upon a relation of principles to each other.
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The author cites law review articles freely. As the use of this excellent material becomes more general we hope treatise writers will
establish a practice of appending a table of these sources as they do
with decisions.
In this brief review we have tried to show that this book is an
exposition of principle, enriched by reasoned opinions that are useful
to lawyers generally, to say nothing of legislators. It is an excellent
companion for the author's book on Liquidation. The jugglery of insolvent debtors is not an inherently pleasant subject but Professor
Glenn brings to his task a fund of humor, satire and pkturesque expression which lightens the labor of the reader.

